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Abstract—This paper tackles the problem of how two selfish
users jointly determine the operating point in the achievable
rate region of a two-user Gaussian interference channel through
bargaining. In previous work, incentive conditions for two users
to cooperate using a simple version of Han-Kobayashi scheme
was studied and the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) was used to
obtain a fair operating point. Here a noncooperative bargaining
game of alternating offers is adopted to model the bargaining
process and rates resulting from the equilibrium outcome are
analyzed. In particular, it is shown that the operating point
resulting from the formulated bargaining game depends on the
cost of delay in bargaining and how bargaining proceeds. If
the associated bargaining problem is regular, a unique perfect
equilibrium exists and lies on the individual rational efficient
frontier of the achievable rate region. Besides, the equilibrium
outcome approaches the NBS if the bargaining costs of both users
are negligible.
I. INTRODUCTION
The two-user interference channel (IC) is a fundamental
model in information theory for studying interference in
communication systems. In this model, each user’s transmitter
sends an independent message to its corresponding receiver via
a common channel and the two communication links interfere
with each other. The capacity region for the Gaussian IC is not
known in general, but a simplified version of a scheme [1] due
to Han and Kobayashi [2] has recently been shown to result in
an achievable rate region that is within one bit of the capacity
region for all ranges of channel parameters. However, any type
of Han-Kobayashi (H-K) scheme requires full cooperation1
between the two users through the choice of transmission
strategy. In practice, users may be selfish in the sense that
they choose a transmission strategy to maximize their own
rates only. In this case, they may not have an incentive to
comply with a certain rule as in the H-K scheme and therefore
not all rate pairs in an achievable rate region are actually
attainable. Such a scenario becomes increasingly relevant as
dynamic spectrum access and sharing becomes important due
to the deregulation of wireless spectrum. When there is no
coordination among the users, interference is usually treated
This material is based upon work partially supported by NSF Grant No.
0635177, by the Center for Advanced Technology in Telecommunications
(CATT) of Polytechnic Institute of NYU.
1Throughout the paper, “cooperation” means cooperation for the choice
of transmission strategy including codebook and rate selection and time
sharing, which is different from cooperation in information transmission as
in cooperative communications [3].
as noise, which is information theoretically suboptimal in most
cases.
When users have conflicting interests, the question of how
users interact with each other to achieve efficiency and fairness
is usually investigated using game theory. The Gaussian IC
was studied using noncooperative game theory in [4] [5] [6],
where it was assumed that the receivers treat the interference
as Gaussian noise. For the related Gaussian multiple-access
channel (MAC), it was shown in [7] that in a noncooperative
rate game with two selfish users choosing their transmission
rates independently, all points on the dominant face of the ca-
pacity region are pure strategy Nash Equilibria (NE). However,
no single NE is superior to the others, making it impossible to
single out one particular NE to operate at. Noncooperative in-
formation theoretical games were considered by Berry and Tse
assuming that each user can select any encoding and decoding
strategy to maximize its own rate and a Nash equilibrium
region was characterized for a class of deterministic IC’s [8].
Extensions were made to a symmetric Gaussian IC in [9].
Another game theoretical approach for studying interfering
links is using the Nash bargaining solution (NBS) from cooper-
ative game theory, e.g., [10], [11], [12], [13]. The advantage of
the NBS is that it not only provides a Pareto optimal operating
point from the point of view of the entire system, but is also
consistent with the fairness axioms of game theory. However,
one of the assumptions upon which cooperative bargaining is
built is that the users are committed to the agreement reached
in bargaining [14], which requires some form of centralized
coordination to ensure that all the parties involved operate
at the agreed upon point. In an unregulated environment, a
centralized authority may be lacking and in such cases more
realistic bargaining between users through communication
over a side channel may become necessary. Besides, in most
works that designate the NBS as a desired solution, each user’s
cost of delay in bargaining is not taken into account and little
is known regarding how bargaining proceeds. Motivated by
all these, we will study the Gaussian IC bargaining problem
by introducing a noncooperative bargaining model named the
alternating-offer bargaining game (AOBG) [15] [16] from bar-
gaining theory. This approach is different from the NBS in that
it models the bargaining process between users explicitly as a
non-cooperative multi-stage game in which the users alternate
making offers until one is accepted. The equilibrium of such
a game describes what bargaining strategies would be adopted
by the users and thus provides a nice prediction to the result
of noncooperative bargaining. To the best of our knowledge,
our approach provides the first application of dynamic AOBG
from bargaining theory to network information theory.
Similar to [13], we assume coordination between users is
done in two phases. In phase 1, the two users negotiate and
only if certain incentive conditions are satisfied they agree to
use a particular transmission scheme that can achieve higher
rates for both users than treating interference as noise. Such
a scheme can be either a simple H-K type scheme from
[1] or an orthogonal scheme like TDM or FDM. Conditions
under which users can benefit from cooperating using the H-K
scheme and the orthogonal one have been investigated in [13]
and [12] respectively. In phase 2, provided that negotiation in
phase 1 is successful, the users bargain over the achievable rate
region of the chosen scheme to find an acceptable operating
point. This paper differs from [13] primarily in that we adopt
the AOBG formulation for bargaining instead of the NBS in
phase 2. The two-user bargaining problem is considered in an
uncoordinated environment where the ongoing bargaining may
be interrupted, for example, by other users wishing to access
the channel. Each user’s cost of delay in bargaining is derived
from an exogenous probability which characterizes the risk
of breakdown of bargaining due to some outside intervention.
The AOBG with risk of breakdown is introduced to model
the bargaining process and the negotiation outcome in terms
of achievable rates is analyzed. We show that the equilibrium
outcome of the AOBG lies on the individual rational efficient
frontier of the rate region with its exact location depend-
ing on the exogenous probabilities of breakdown. When the
breakdown probabilities are very small, it is shown that the
equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash solution.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we present the channel model, describe the achiev-
able rate regions of a simple H-K type scheme and the TDM
scheme, review the concept of AOBG from game theory. We
first illustrate how the two users play an AOBG to determine
an operating point over the Gaussian MAC in Section III. Then
in Section IV we apply the AOBG framework to the Gaussian
IC and characterize the equilibrium of the AOBG when the
associated bargaining problem is regular. Numerical results
are illustrated in Section V. Finally we draw conclusions in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Channel Model
In this paper, we focus on the two-user standard Gaussian
IC as shown in Fig. 1
Y1 = X1 +
√
aX2 + Z1 (1)
Y2 =
√
bX1 +X2 + Z2 (2)
where Xi and Yi represent the input and output of user
i ∈ {1, 2}, respectively, and Z1 and Z2 are i.i.d. Gaussian
with zero mean and unit variance. Receiver i is only interested
in the message sent by transmitter i. Constants
√
a and
√
b
represent the real-valued channel gains of the interfering links.
If a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1, the channel is strong Gaussian IC; if either
0 < a < 1 and b ≥ 1, or 0 < b < 1 and a ≥ 1, the channel is
mixed Gaussian IC; if 0 < a < 1 and 0 < b < 1, the channel
is weak Gaussian IC. We assume that transmitter of user i,
i ∈ {1, 2}, is subject to an average power constraint Pi. We
let SNRi = Pi be the signal to noise ratio (SNR) of user i.
B. Achievable Rate Regions
The best known inner bound for the two-user Gaussian
IC is the full H-K achievable region [2]. Even when the
input distributions in the H-K scheme are restricted to be
Gaussian, computation of the full H-K region remains difficult
due to numerous degrees of freedom involved in the problem
[17]. Therefore for the purpose of evaluating and computing
bargaining solutions, we assume users employ Gaussian code-
books with equal length codewords and consider a simplified
H-K type scheme with fixed power split and no time-sharing
as in [1]. Let α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ [0, 1] denote the fractions
of power allocated to the private messages (messages only
to be decoded at intended receivers) of user 1 and user 2
respectively. We define F as the collection of all rate pairs
(R1, R2) ∈ R2+ satisfying
R1 ≤ φ1 = C
(
P1
1 + aβP2
)
(3)
R2 ≤ φ2 = C
(
P2
1 + bαP1
)
(4)
R1 +R2 ≤ φ3 = min{φ31, φ32, φ33} (5)
with
φ31 = C
(
P1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
βP2
1 + bαP1
)
φ32 = C
(
αP1
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
P2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
φ33 = C
(
αP1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
βP2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
and
2R1 +R2 ≤ φ4 = C
(
P1 + a(1− β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
+ C
(
αP1
1 + aβP2
)
+C
(
βP2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
(6)
R1 + 2R2 ≤ φ5 = C
(
P2 + b(1− α)P1
1 + bαP1
)
+ C
(
βP2
1 + bαP1
)
+C
(
αP1 + a(1 − β)P2
1 + aβP2
)
(7)
where C(x) = 1/2 log2(1 + x). The region F is a polytope
and a function of α and β. We denote the H-K scheme that
achieves the rate region F by HK(α, β). For convenience, we
also represent F in a matrix form as F = {R|R ≥ 0, R ≤
R1, and AR ≤ B}, where R = (R1 R2)t, R1 = (φ1 φ2)t,
1a
b
1X
2X
1Z
2Z
1Y
2Y
1
+
+
Fig. 1. Gaussian interference channel
B = (φ3 φ4 φ5)
t
, and
A =
(
1 2 1
1 1 2
)t
(8)
Throughout the paper, for any two vectors U and V, we denote
U ≥ V if and only if Ui ≥ Vi for all i. U ≤ V, U > V and
U < V are defined similarly.
In the strong interference case, the capacity region is known
[18] [2] and is achieved by HK(0, 0), i.e., both users send
common messages only to be decoded at both destinations. It
is the collection of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ C(P1),
R2 ≤ C(P2),
R1 +R2 ≤ φ6 = min{C(P1 + aP2), C(bP1 + P2)} (9)
Note that φ6 = φ3 for α = β = 0.
For the strong interference case, we choose optimal α =
β = 0. For the mixed and weak cases, as in [13], we
choose α and β as the near optimal power split of [1], which
achieves a rate region that is within one bit to the capacity
region. That is, for weak interference a < 1 and b < 1,
we set α = min(1/(bP1), 1) and β = min(1/(aP2), 1); for
mixed interference a < 1 and b ≥ 1, we set α = 0 and
β = min(1/(aP2), 1).
A simple strategy for the two users to cooperate is through
time division avoiding interference. In this case, user i trans-
mits a fraction ρi(0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1) of the time under the constraint
ρ1+ρ2 ≤ 1. For a given vector ρ = (ρ1 ρ2)t, the rate obtained
by user i is given by Ri(ρ) = Ri(ρi) = ρiC(Piρi ). Hence, the
TDM rate region is given by
RTDM = {R|R = (R1(ρ1) R2(ρ2))t, ρ1 + ρ2 ≤ 1} (10)
Note that, unlike the simple H-K scheme, the shape of the
TDM rate region does not depend on the cross-link channel
gains
√
a and
√
b.
C. Overview of Bargaining Games
1) Definitions: A two-player bargaining problem consists
of a pair (G,g0) where G is a closed convex subset of R2,
g0 = (g01 g
0
2)
t is a vector in R2, and the set G ∩ {g|g ≥ g0}
is nonempty and bounded. Here G is the set of all possible
payoff allocations or agreements that the two players can
jointly achieve, and g0 ∈ G is the payoff allocation that results
if players fail to agree. We refer to G as the feasible set and to
g0 as the disagreement point. We say the bargaining problem
(G,g0) is essential iff there exists at least one allocation g′ in
G that is strictly better for both players than g0, i.e., the set
G ∩ {g|g > g0} is nonempty; we say (G,g0) is regular iff G
is essential and for any payoff allocation g in G [15],
if g1 > g01 , then ∃gˇ ∈ G such that g01 ≤ gˇ1 < g1 and gˇ2 > g2,
(11)
if g2 > g02 , then ∃gˆ ∈ G such that g02 ≤ gˆ2 < g2 and gˆ1 > g1,
(12)
Here (11) and (12) state that whenever a player gets strictly
higher payoff than in the disagreement point, then there exists
another allocation such that the payoff of the player is reduced
while the other player’s payoff is strictly increased.
An agreement g is said to be efficient iff there is no
agreement in the feasible set G that makes every player strictly
better off. We refer to the set of all efficient agreements as
the efficient frontier of G. In addition, we refer to the efficient
frontier of the individual rational feasible set G∩{g|g ≥ g0} as
the individual rational efficient frontier. Given that G is closed
and convex, the regularity conditions in (11) and (12) hold iff
the individual rational efficient frontier is strictly monotone,
i.e., it contains no horizonal or vertical line segments.
2) The Bargaining Game of Alternating Offers: In the
NBS approach for bargaining, most information concerning
the bargaining environment and procedure is abstracted away,
and each player’s cost of delay in bargaining is not taken into
account. A dynamic strategic model of bargaining called the
alternating-offer bargaining game, on the other hand, provides
a detailed description of the bargaining process. In the AOBG,
two players take turns in making proposals of payoff allocation
in G until one is accepted or negotiation breaks down.
An important issue regarding modeling of the AOBG is
about the cost of delay in bargaining, as it is directly related
to players’ motives to settle in an agreement rather than
insist indefinitely on incompatible demands. In the bargaining
game considered in this paper, we derive the cost of delay
in bargaining from an exogenous risk of breakdown; i.e.,
after each round, the bargaining process may terminate in
disagreement permanently with an exogenous positive prob-
ability if the proposal made in that round gets rejected. In
a wireless network, this probability could correspond to the
event that other users present in the environment intervene
and snatch the opportunity of negotiation on transmission
strategies between a pair of users. For example, consider an
uncoordinated environment when multiple users operate over a
common channel. By default each user’s receiver only decodes
the intended message from its transmitter and treats the other
users’ signals as noise. However, groups of users are allowed
to coordinate their transmission strategies to improve their
respective rates. In the case of a two-user group, if one user’s
proposal gets rejected by the other user in any bargaining
round, it is reasonable to assume that it may terminate the
bargaining process with a certain probability and turn to a
third user for negotiation.
Consider a regular bargaining problem (G,g0) and the
two players involved play a dynamic noncooperative game
to determine an outcome. Let p1 and p2 be the probabilities
of breakdown that satisfy 0 < p1 < 1 and 0 < p2 < 1.
These probabilities of breakdown measure players’ costs of
delay in bargaining and are assumed to be known by both
players. The bargaining procedure of this game is as follows.
Player 1 and player 2 alternate making an offer in every odd-
numbered round and every even-numbered round respectively.
An offer made in each round can be any agreement in the
feasible set G. Within each round, after the player whose turn
it is to offer announces the proposal, the other player can
either accept or reject. In any odd-numbered round, if player
2 rejects the offer made by player 1, there is a probability p1
that the bargaining will end in the disagreement g0. Similarly,
in any even-numbered round, if player 1 rejects the offer made
by player 2, there is a probability p2 that the bargaining will
end in the disagreement g0. This process begins from round
1 and continues until some offer is accepted or the game ends
in disagreement. When an offer is accepted, an agreement is
applied and thus the users get the payoffs specified in the
accepted offer. Note in the game described above, the two
players only get payoffs at a single round in this game, which
is the round at which the bargaining ends in either agreement
or disagreement.
For this multi-stage bargaining game, a subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) is a Nash equilibrium of the whole game
with the additional property that the equilibrium strategies
induce a Nash equilibrium in every subgame as well. A formal
description of the bargaining process in the context of an
extensive game with perfect information and chance moves
[16] can be found in the journal version of this paper [19] but
will be omitted here.
Theorem 1: For any regular two-player bargaining prob-
lem (G,g0), the corresponding AOBG described above has
a unique SPE. Let (g¯, g˜) be the unique pair of efficient
agreements in G which satisfy
g˜1 = (1− p2)(g¯1 − g01) + g01 (13)
g¯2 = (1− p1)(g˜2 − g02) + g02 (14)
In the SPE, player 1 always proposes an offer g¯ and accepts
any offer g with g1 ≥ g˜1; user 2 always proposes an offer
g˜ and accepts any offer g with g2 ≥ g¯2. Therefore, in
equilibrium, the game will end in an agreement on g¯ at round
1.
Proof: The proof of this theorem is similar to that of
Theorem 8.3 in [15] with the disagreement outcome fixed to g0
after the breakdown in any round. Regularity of the bargaining
problem is essential for the proof of the uniqueness of the SPE.
In [20], it is found that as p1 and p2 approach to zero, the
equilibrium outcome of the AOBG converges to the NBS. In
other words, if there are no external forces to terminate the
bargaining process, the equilibrium outcome of the dynamic
game approaches the NBS. More discussion will be given
on how the probabilities of breakdown p1 and p2 affect
the equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game in the later
sections.
III. BARGAINING OVER THE TWO-USER GAUSSIAN MAC
Before we move to the Gaussian IC, we first consider
a Gaussian MAC in which two users send information to
one common receiver. This also forms the foundation for the
solution of the strong IC. The received signal is given by
Y = X1 +X2 + Z (15)
where Xi is the input signal of user i and Z is Gaussian noise
with zero mean and unit variance. Each user has an individual
average input power constraint Pi. The capacity region C is
the set of all rate pairs (R1, R2) such that
Ri ≤ C(Pi), i ∈ {1, 2} (16)
R1 +R2 ≤ φ0 = C(P1 + P2) (17)
If the two users fully cooperate in codebook and rate selection,
any point in C is achievable. When there is no coordination
between users, in the worst case, one user’s signal can be
treated as noise in the decoding of the other user’s signal,
leading to rate R0i = C( Pi1+P3−i ) for user i. In [7], R0i is
also called user i’s “safe rate”. If the two users are selfish but
willing to coordinate for mutual benefits, they may bargain
over C to determine an operating point with R0 serving as a
disagreement point.
In this section, we apply the AOBG formulation to the
two-user MAC and analyze the negotiation results. For the
two-user MAC bargaining problem (C0,R0), the individual
rational efficient frontier is simply the dominant face of
the capacity region and is strictly monotone, therefore the
regularity conditions in Section II always hold. Using Theorem
1, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: For the two-user MAC bargaining problem
(C0,R0), the unique pair of agreements (R¯, R˜) in the SPE of
the AOBG is given by
(R¯1 R¯2 R˜1 R˜2)
t = M−1(−p2R01 p1R02 φ0 φ0)t (18)
where
M =


1− p2 0 −1 0
0 1 0 −(1− p1)
1 1 0 0
0 0 1 1

 (19)
In equilibrium, the game will end in an agreement on R¯ at
round 1.
Proof: From (13) and (14) in Theorem 1, it follows that
the unique pair of agreements (R¯, R˜) in the SPE must satisfy
R˜1 = (1− p2)(R¯1 −R01) +R01 (20)
R¯2 = (1− p1)(R˜2 −R02) +R02 (21)
In addition, since R¯ and R˜ need to be efficient agreements,
we have
R¯1 + R¯2 = φ0 (22)
R˜1 + R˜2 = φ0 (23)
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Fig. 2. Bargaining rates over the MAC when SNR1 = 20dB, SNR2 = 15dB
Solving (20), (21), (22) and (23), we obtain the unique pair
of agreements (R¯, R˜) as in the proposition.
Clearly, if user 2 makes an offer during the first round
instead, the equilibrium outcome would be R˜. It is not hard to
see from (20), (21) that if p1 = p2 = 0, then we have R˜ = R¯.
In Fig. 2, the capacity region, the disagreement point and the
equilibrium outcomes of the AOBG obtained using Proposition
1 are illustrated for SNR1 = 20dB and SNR2 = 15dB. For
comparison, the NBS studied in [13] is also included in the
plot. The unique pairs of agreements (R¯, R˜) are shown for
two different choices of p1 and p2. Recall that offer of user
1 in SPE R¯ corresponds to the equilibrium outcome of the
AOBG since we assume user 1 makes an offer first. If user 2
is the first mover instead, offer of user 2 in SPE R˜ becomes the
equilibrium outcome of the game. For a fixed pair of p1 and
p2, each user’s rate in the equilibrium outcome is higher when
it is the first mover than when it is not. Such a phenomenon
is referred to as “first mover advantage” in [16]. Finally, as
shown in the figure, when p1 and p2 become smaller, both R˜
and R¯ are closer to the Nash solution.
IV. TWO-USER GAUSSIAN IC
For the IC, the coordination between the two users is done
in two phases as proposed in [13]. In phase 1, users check
whether a particular transmission scheme, either a simple H-
K type scheme or TDM, improves individual rates for both
over those in disagreement R0 = (C( P1
1+aP2
) C( P2
1+bP1
))t.
If there is no improvement for at least one user, then that
user does not have the incentive to cooperate using the chosen
scheme and negotiation breaks down. In such a scenario, users
operate at the disagreement point R0; otherwise, they reach
an agreement on the use of the chosen scheme and proceed to
phase 2. In phase 2, the users bargain for a rate pair to operate
at over the achievable rate region of the scheme they agreed on
earlier. If the H-K scheme is employed for cooperation, once
a particular rate pair is determined as the bargaining outcome,
related codebook information is shared between the users so
that one user’s receiver can decode the other user’s common
message as required by the adopted H-K scheme in agreement.
If TDM is employed, the time division vector that leads to
the rate pair in agreement can be determined accordingly and
both users only need to transmit during the portions of time as
specified in the vector. No sharing of codebook information is
needed in this case. In the following, we discuss the Gaussian
IC bargaining problem when the H-K scheme and TDM are
employed for cooperation respectively.
A. Cooperating using the H-K scheme
In this subsection, we assume users employ the simple H-K
scheme with optimal or near-optimal power split as discussed
in Section II-B for cooperation. The conditions under which
both users have incentives to cooperate using this scheme have
been studied in [13]. We summarize these conditions in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2: For the two-user Gaussian IC, phase 1 is
successful and both users have incentives to employ an H-K
scheme provided one of the following conditions hold. The
conditions also list the H-K scheme employed by the users.
• Strong interference (a ≥ 1 and b ≥ 1): Users always
employ HK(0,0);
• Weak interference (a < 1 and b < 1): Users employ
HK(1/(bP1),1/(aP2)) iff aP2 > 1 and bP1 > 1 and
F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty when α = 1/(bP1) and
β = 1/(aP2);
• Mixed interference (a < 1 and b ≥ 1): Users employ
HK(0,1/(aP2)) iff aP2 > 1 and F ∩ {R > R0} is
nonempty when α = 0 and β = 1/(aP2).
In phase 2, unlike in the MAC case, the associated IC
bargaining problem is not always regular. If it is non-regular,
the AOBG may have more than one SPE’s resulting in distinct
bargaining outcomes, which puts any of the SPE’s and the
corresponding outcome in doubt [16]. Hence the non-regular
case is not treated here. In the following, we first discuss
the regularity of the IC bargaining problem under different
interference regimes and then characterize the unique SPE of
the AOBG when the bargaining problem is regular.
Proposition 3: Provided that phase 1 is successful, in phase
2, the two-user Gaussian IC bargaining problem (F ,R0) is
regular iff one of the following conditions hold:
• Strong interference: a = b = 1;
• Weak interference: R01 ≥ (φ5 − 2φ2)+ and R02 ≥ (φ4 −
2φ1)
+;
• Mixed interference: R01 ≥ (min(φ5 − 2φ2, φ3 − φ2))+
and R02 ≥ (min(φ4 − 2φ1, φ3 − φ1))+;
where φi, i = 1, ..., 5 are defined in (3)-(7).
Proof: In the strong interference case, in phase 1, the
users choose optimal α = β = 0. The resulting capacity region
is shown in Fig. 3(a). Note that only two extreme points of
the region are in the first quadrant and they are r1 = (φ6 −
C(P2), C(P2)) and r2 = (C(P1), φ6 − C(P1)). It is easy to
show that R01 ≤ φ6 − C(P2) and R02 ≤ φ6 − C(P1) with
equalities holding only when a = b = 1. In order for the
individual rational efficient frontier to be strictly monotone,
it must contain no horizonal or vertical line segments, which
1
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Fig. 3. Achievable rate region using a simple H-K scheme under different interference regimes
requires R01 ≥ φ6−C(P2) and R02 ≥ φ6−C(P1). Hence, the
associated bargaining problem is regular iff a = b = 1.
In the weak interference case, by Proposition 2, in
phase 1, both users have incentives to cooperate using
HK(1/(bP1), 1/(aP2)) if aP2 > 1, bP1 > 1 and F ∩ {R >
R0} is nonempty when α = 1/(bP1) and β = 1/(aP2). The
shape of achievable rate region is shown in Fig. 3(b). It has
been proved in [17] that the points r′i /∈ F for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6}.
Therefore there are at most2 four extreme points in the first
quadrant of Fig. 3(b), given by
r1 = (φ1, φ4 − 2φ1) (24)
r2 = (φ4 − φ3, 2φ3 − φ4) (25)
r3 = (2φ3 − φ5, φ5 − φ3) (26)
r4 = (φ5 − 2φ2, φ2) (27)
where φi, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., 5} are given in (3)-(7) with α =
1/(bP1) and β = 1/(aP2). In order for the individual rational
efficient frontier to be strictly monotone, it must contain no
horizonal or vertical line segments. If r1 is in the first quadrant,
R02 ≥ φ4 − 2φ1 must hold and similarly if r4 is in the first
quadrant, R01 ≥ φ5 − 2φ2 must hold. Hence, the associated
bargaining problem is regular iff two additional conditions
R01 ≥ (φ5 − 2φ2)+ and R02 ≥ (φ4 − 2φ1)+ are satisfied.
Here (·)+ means max(·, 0).
In the mixed interference case, by Proposition 2, in phase
1, both users cooperate using HK(0, 1/(aP2)) if aP2 > 1
and F ∩ {R > R0} is nonempty when α = 0 and
β = 1/(aP2). Similar to the weak interference case, there
are at most four extreme points in the first quadrant of Fig.
3(b) except that r′1 = (φ1, φ3 − φ1) or r′5 = (φ3 − φ2, φ2)
may become an extreme point of F , depending on whether
the constraint (6) or (7) is redundant or not respectively.
In order for the individual rational efficient frontier to be
strictly monotone, it must contain no horizonal or vertical
line segments. If r1 and r′1 are both in the first quadrant,
2In [17], the authors concluded that there should be exactly four extreme
points in the first quadrant, but we find that under some parameters one or
two of the four points may actually not lie in the first quadrant. For instance,
it is possible that φ5−2φ2 < 0, in which case r4 is not in the first quadrant.
R02 ≥ min(φ4 − 2φ1, φ3 − φ1) must hold and if r4 and r′5
are both in the first quadrant, R01 ≥ min(φ5 − 2φ2, φ3 − φ2)
must hold. Hence, the associated bargaining problem is regular
iff two additional conditions R01 ≥ (min(φ5−2φ2, φ3−φ2))+
and R02 ≥ (min(φ4 − 2φ1, φ3 − φ1))+ are satisfied.
When phase 1 is successful and the Gaussian IC bargaining
problem (F ,R0) is regular, using Theorem 1, we have the
following result.
Proposition 4: For any regular Gaussian IC bargaining
problem (F ,R0), the unique pair of agreements (R¯, R˜)
and the equilibrium strategies in the SPE of the AOBG are
characterized in Theorem 1 with G = F of Section II-B,
g0 = R0 = (C( P1
1+aP2
) C( P2
1+bP1
))t, g¯ = R¯ and g˜ = R˜.
In the strong interference case a = b = 1, the unique
pair of agreements (R¯, R˜) in the SPE can be obtained using
(18) in Proposition 1 with φ0 replaced by φ6. For the weak
and mixed interference cases, since the shape of the H-K
rate region and the relative location of the disagreement point
vary as parameters a, b, P1 and P2 change, it is difficult to
obtain a general expression for (R¯, R˜). However, when all
the parameters are given and the corresponding power split
parameters α and β are fixed, the H-K rate region and the
disagreement point R0 can be determined accordingly. Since
R¯ and R˜ both lie on the individual rational efficient frontier
of F which is piecewise linear, we can compute (R¯, R˜) by
solving linear equations.
B. Cooperating using TDM
When the two users cooperate using TDM, the achievable
rate region is RTDM as defined in Section II. In the strong in-
terference case, TDM is strictly suboptimal in terms of achiev-
able rate region; however in the mixed and weak interference
cases, the H-K scheme does not always dominate TDM. Due
to simplicity of implementation of TDM compared with the
H-K scheme, we also investigate the AOBG formulation when
TDM is employed for cooperation.
In phase 1, both users have incentives to cooperate using
TDM if (RTDM ,R0) is essential, i.e., if there exists at least
one time division vector ρ = (ρ1 ρ2)t such that Ri(ρi) > R0i ,
for i = 1, 2. In other words, R0 must lie strictly inside RTDM .
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Fig. 4. The NBS and equilibrium outcomes of AOBG for IC under mixed
interference with a = 0.2, b = 1.2, SNR1 = 10dB and SNR2 = 20dB.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
p1
R
at
es
 in
 th
e 
SP
E 
ou
tc
om
e 
of
 A
O
BG
 
 
User 1
User 2
Fig. 5. Rate of each user in SPE of AOBG as a function of breakdown
probability p1 when p2 = 0.5 for IC under mixed interference with a = 0.2,
b = 1.2, SNR1 = 10dB and SNR2 = 20dB.
Otherwise, at least one user would not have the incentive
to cooperate using TDM and negotiation breaks down. More
discussion on conditions under which users can benefit from
cooperating using an orthogonal scheme can be found in
[12]. Since the Pareto boundary of RTDM corresponds to
ρ1 + ρ2 = 1 and is strictly monotone, the bargaining problem
(RTDM ,R0) is regular as long as it is essential.
For the TDM case, using Theorem 1, we have the following
results for the AOBG played in phase 2.
Proposition 5: For any essential bargaining problem
(RTDM ,R0) over the two-user Gaussian IC, the unique pair
of agreements (R¯, R˜) and the equilibrium strategies in the
SPE of the AOBG are characterized in Theorem 1 with
G = RTDM in (10), g0 = R0 = (C( P11+aP2 ) C(
P2
1+bP1
))t,
g¯ = R¯ and g˜ = R˜.
Unlike the H-K case, the boundary of the TDM rate region
is not linear; however, the unique pair of (R¯, R˜) can be
computed numerically.
V. ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS
In Fig. 4, the unique pair of agreements (R¯, R˜) in the
SPE of the AOBG based on the H-K scheme is shown for
mixed interference with a = 0.2, b = 1.2, SNR1 = 10dB
and SNR2 = 20dB for three different choices of the pair of
probabilities of breakdown p1 and p2. According to Proposi-
tion 2, in phase 1, the two users decide to cooperate using
HK(0, 0.05). Furthermore, by Proposition 3, the bargaining
problem in phase 2 is regular. As in the MAC case, user 1’s
offer in SPE R¯ corresponds to the equilibrium outcome of
the AOBG since we assume user 1 makes an offer first. If
user 2 moves first instead, user 2’s offer in SPE R˜ would
become the equilibrium outcome of the game. We can see
that as p1 and p2 change, R¯ and R˜ move along the individual
rational efficient frontier of F . When p1 = 0.5 and p2 = 0.5,
user 1’s rate in R¯ is greater than that in the NBS; but when
p1 = 0.1 and p2 = 0.5, its rate in R¯ is smaller than that
in the NBS. As both p1 and p2 decrease to 0.1, both R¯ and
R˜ become closer to the Nash solution. The rate of each user
in the equilibrium outcome R¯ as a function of breakdown
probability p1 is plotted in Fig. 5 when p2 is fixed to 0.5
under the same channel parameters. As p1 gets larger, user 1’s
rate increases while user 2’s decreases. The larger p1 becomes,
the more likely that bargaining may terminate in disagreement
when user 1’s offer is rejected by user 2. This demonstrates
that if user 1 fears less about the bargaining breakdown, it
can be more advantageous in bargaining. It should also be
emphasized that the equilibrium is unique and agreement is
reached in round 1 in equilibrium. In this sense, the bargaining
mechanism of AOBG is highly efficient.
Fig. 6 illustrates the equilibrium outcomes of the AOBG
when the H-K and TDM cooperating schemes are used re-
spectively for two different channel gain vectors under mixed
interference when SNR1 = 20dB and SNR2 = 30dB. The
probabilities of breakdowns are set as p1 = p2 = 0.5. The
NBS’s in both cases are also plotted for reference. In Fig.
6(a), a = 0.1 and b = 1.2, hence in the H-K scheme the
power splits are fixed to be α = 0 and β = 0.01. In this
case, the individual rational efficient frontier in H-K strictly
dominates the one in TDM and thus both users’ rates in all
the bargaining outcomes are superior to those in TDM. In
Fig. 6(b), the channel parameters are set to a = 0.2 and
b = 1.2 and HK(0, 0.005) is employed. The individual rational
efficient frontiers in H-K and TDM intersect. We observe that
while user 2 gets higher rates in all the bargaining outcomes
in TDM than in H-K, user 1’s rates in H-K are superior to
those in TDM. Hence, we can conclude that, depending on the
channel parameters and power constraints, the two users may
have distinct preferences between the transmission schemes
employed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the problem of how two
selfish users over the Gaussian IC coordinate their transmission
strategies to boost their rates. The two users first negotiate
for the use of either a simple H-K type scheme or TDM
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Fig. 6. Comparison of bargaining outcomes when the H-K and TDM schemes are used respectively under mixed interference with SNR1 = 20dB,
SNR2 = 30dB and p1 = p2 = 0.5.
in phase 1 and then they bargain over the achievable rate
region of the chosen scheme to determine a point to operate
at in phase 2. Unlike in the previous work where the NBS
is used to select a fair operating point, the dynamic AOBG
is adopted to model the bargaining process and determine a
bargaining outcome in phase 2. As a problem of independent
interest, and also as a tool for developing the optimal solution
in the strong interference regime, we first study the MAC
before moving on to the IC. The results from the dynamic
AOBG show that the bargaining game has a unique SPE and
in equilibrium the agreement is reached immediately in the
first bargaining round provided that the associated bargaining
problem is regular. The exogenous probabilities of breakdown
and which user makes a proposal first also play important roles
in the final outcome. When the cost of delay in bargaining is
not negligible, that is, exogenous probabilities of breakdown
are high, the equilibrium outcome deviates from the NBS. We
conclude that when we consider coordination and bargaining
over the IC, factors such as the cost of delay in bargaining
and the environment in which bargaining takes place should
also be taken into consideration.
Regarding possible extensions to this work, it would be also
interesting to model the cost of delay in bargaining under
other assumptions such as each user’s payoff is discounted
by a factor of δ after each round [21] [20] or the amount of
communication overhead incurred. In addition, the bargaining
framework here can be extended to the two-user MIMO IC
using the results of [22] [23].
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